The CQ Researcher : Reforming the CIA

From the February 2, 1996 issue of The CQ Researcher, Volume 6, No. 5, p. 109, 111-112.

The Clinton Administration Plan

Overhauling the Agency

The FBI's arrest of Aldrich Ames in 1994 led to perhaps the most damaging scandal in the CIA's turbulent history. Ames' treasonous work had gone unchecked for nine years. If the spy agency couldn't even detect such activities among its own staff, critics asked, how could it be effective in the rest of the world?

The Ames scandal continued to take its toll on the CIA's credibility in late 1995, when it was revealed that for eight years the agency had knowingly handed over to three presidents, and to the Pentagon, intelligence that had come from double agents who worked for both the CIA and the KGB. Moreover, the CIA had not said anything about the double agents. [1]

Together with the radically altered international environment of the post-Cold War era, the Ames scandal prompted the most thorough review of U.S. intelligence needs since the CIA's founding. Alternatives being considered by the Brown commission and congressional committees range from abolishing the CIA altogether to giving it greater powers than it has enjoyed since the CIA's heyday under Dulles.

Clinton's Goals

The bipartisan, 17-member Brown commission, appointed last February by President Clinton and the congressional leadership, was given a year, under the fiscal 1995 intelligence authorization act, to present its recommendations. “During the Cold War, U.S. intelligence agencies focused their activities principally on monitoring and analyzing the activities of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies,” the commission's work plan states. “With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, is this intelligence apparatus still needed? If so, what are the continuing objectives served by such an apparatus? How should it be organized? What should it cost?” [2]

The Brown commission is but one element of President Clinton's attempt to redefine the intelligence community's mission. Last March, the president signed a classified order outlining his priorities for CIA operations in coming years. The directive established a committee of senior officials from agencies that use intelligence data and charged them with defining the kinds of information they want to receive from the CIA and other spy agencies. By authorizing the CIA's “customers” to order the data they want, Clinton greatly curtailed the agency's freedom to act independently.

As the intelligence community's most important customer, the president has for the past year held the key to the agency's future, pending completion of the Brown commission's review next month. Clinton's list of intelligence priorities reportedly has focused on “rogue” nations - chiefly Iran, Iraq and North Korea - which have been implicated in terrorism and nuclear proliferation; Islamic fundamentalist groups involved in terrorism; and sources of future threats to U.S. security. Economic-intelligence gathering, a controversial mission for the spy agencies, came lower on the president's list. [3]

Since deciding to send American troops to help enforce the recent Dayton peace accord ending hostilities in Bosnia, Clinton has focused the intelligence community's activities on providing military data to support Pentagon strategy. Since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when military commanders complained that they did not receive the intelligence they needed fast enough, the Defense Department has tried to wrest control over intelligence matters from the CIA. The ensuing turf war has colored the debate over intelligence missions for the future.

Deutch Takes Over

In the eight months since he became the 17th director of central intelligence, Deutch has taken a number of steps to help shape the community's future direction. As soon as he took office, he ordered a shake-up of CIA personnel, replacing top managers who were deemed tainted by the Ames scandal. In an effort to more effectively carry out his role over the community as a whole, he appointed Nora Slatkin as the agency's executive director and George J. Tenet as deputy director in charge of day-to-day operations and administration. *

While he has refrained from more sweeping organizational changes, Deutch has taken steps to more closely coordinate the activities of military and civilian intelligence operations. He has proposed the merger of two offices to jointly run the management and acquisition of military and intelligence satellites. The Joint Space Management Board would be co-directed by Deutch and his former superior, Defense Secretary Perry, with whom Deutch reportedly continues to enjoy a close relationship. “This is an important step forward that will lead to a cost savings in the long run,” Deutch told lawmakers. [4]

A more controversial proposal put forward by Deutch would consolidate the military and civilian offices that analyze and distribute geo-locational data into a single National Imagery and Mapping Agency. “The motivation for this change,” the director explained, “is primarily to meet the military's need for dominant battlefield awareness and, as the Gulf war illustrated, the need for imagery to be distributed in a timely fashion to battlefield commanders.” [5] Concerned that Congress had not yet received sufficient information on the proposed new agency, lawmakers prohibited the CIA and the Defense Department from creating the agency as part of the fiscal 1996 intelligence authorization bill. [6]

Deutch's proposals have earned praise from former intelligence officials. “I certainly approve of the move to create a national imagery agency since it was my task force in 1992 that recommended it in the first place,” says Gates, adding that he failed to win the support of then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell. “Taking advantage of the special relationship between Deutch and Perry to implement that recommendation is a good idea and a step forward,” Gates says.

Studeman also worries about the high profile Deutch has assumed, in contrast to the established CIA culture, which calls for officials to assume a less visible role. “I think the intelligence community worries a little bit about the emergence of a cult of personality,” he says. “I think John thinks it's great that he's been on the cover of Parade magazine, but most people in the intelligence community are a little more reclusive. At the same time, we recognize that we have to be more willing to explain to the American public where their dollars are going, for what kinds of operations and why these are important. As long as they are not used to glorify individuals, demystification and openness in intelligence are important.”

[1] See Walter Pincus, “Tainted Moscow Data Swayed U.S., CIA Says,” The Washington Post, Dec. 9, 1995.

[2] From the commission's work plan, submitted June 7, 1995, to the House and Senate Select Intelligence Committees.

[3] See Walter Pincus, “Control Tightened On Spy Agencies,” The Washington Post, March 10, 1995.

[4] From Dec. 19 testimony before the House Select Intelligence Committee.

[5] Ibid.

[6] See Donna Cassata, “Spy Budget Cleared for Clinton; Plan for New Agency Curbed,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Dec. 23, 1996, pp. 3894-3895.

*Before their appointments at CIA, Slatkin was anassistant secretary of the Navy, and Tenet was seniordirector for intelligence programs at the National SecurityCouncil.