Chapter 6: The Foreign-Policy Bureaucracy

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Chapter Summary

Although the president and Congress often set the agenda for foreign-policy making, the day-to-day conduct and administration of U.S. foreign policy are vested in the massive federal bureaucracy. The U.S. foreign-policy bureaucracy can be pictured as having four issue "complexes": diplomatic, security, economic affairs, and intelligence. Each of these issue areas has actors and agencies that are not always in agreement or on the same page. Overall, the U.S. foreign-policy bureaucracy is highly fragmented and decentralized. Yet, policies passed by Congress are often meant to centralize decision making. This conflict is yet another paradox of U.S. foreign policy.

Studying the foreign-policy bureaucracy is critical to understanding the foreign-policy process. The structures and agencies in the federal system outlast members of Congress and presidents, who have limited time, resources, and capacities that prevent them from engaging in day-to-day and even long-term foreign-policy issues. Bureaucrats are vested with the resources, budgets, and expertise to implement policies. Each of the four complexes, however, faces challenges and constraints on its mission that arise from cultural and institutional factors.

The diplomatic complex encompasses the interactions between U.S. agencies and actors and foreign countries, governments, and citizens. These interactions can occur between officials of government or through more informal means of communication aimed directly at the foreign citizenry, often referred to as public diplomacy. The main U.S. institution in the diplomatic complex is the Department of State--the oldest executive agency in the U.S. government. The State Department, headed by the secretary of state, is vested with advising and guiding the president on diplomatic affairs as well as providing citizens with information and access to foreign countries. These missions are often hampered by foreign and domestic disdain for diplomacy as well as the presidential and congressional priorities of security and intelligence budgets.

The security complex receives most of the attention and resources of the U.S. foreign-policy bureaucracy. The Department of Defense (DoD) and National Security Council (NSC) are the two agencies with the most foreign-policy resources and responsibilities. The trend, however, has been to centralize many of the security issues and actors inside the White House. The national security adviser has played an increasingly active role in planning foreign-policy strategies and dealing with security issues. The NSC is often critiqued because of its ad hoc and secretive role. The DoD continues to be the largest organization in both funding and employees; it is extremely fragmented and decentralized as it includes the army, navy, air force, and dozens of agencies. The newly formed Department of Homeland Security now faces problems similar to those of the DoD.

The intelligence and economic complexes are less recognized but no less important. The main component of the intelligence complex is the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which is an independent agency. The other fourteen agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community operate within other departments, such as the DoD, or within branches of the armed services. Each agency has its own agenda and budget, and the agencies have not tended to share their intelligence; this problem was exemplified by the September 11 attacks. The economic complex generally involves the broad mission of coordinating trade and currency markets. The National Economic Council and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative are the main agencies that advise the president and coordinate economic matters with other policy actors.

Each of these complexes faces similar difficulties, which include coordination of resources, agendas, and interests. The increased centralization of resources and staff in the White House have often made cabinet and executive branch bureaucrats less relevant in the policy process. Yet the largest problem for each of the four complexes is the massive size, scope, and self-interest of U.S. foreign-policy institutions.