The CQ Researcher : Islamic Fundamentalism
From the March 24, 2000 issue of The CQ Researcher, Volume 10, No. 11.
Abstract
By David Masci
Can democracy flourish in strict Islamic states?
The recent election of reform candidates to Iran's parliament dealt a blow to the nation's strict Islamic government. Despite Iran's generally free elections, many Westerners say that democracy is inherently impossible in countries run by Islamic fundamentalists. Since the ruling clerics believe God inspires their policies, it is argued, there is little room for the kind of public debate that is vital to a democracy. In addition, fundamentalist states such as Iran, Sudan and Afghanistan are seen as supportive of terrorism and generally hostile to the West. But other experts on the Middle East say the threat posed by fundamentalist states has been exaggerated, largely by the media. They also contend that Iran's elections are proof that Islamic fundamentalism and democracy can coexist.
An Egyptian court last year banned schoolgirls from wearing the niqab, or full-face veil. President Hosni Mubarak has cracked down on violent, anti-government fundamentalism in Egypt but has tried to accommodate more moderate factions by giving religion a more prominent role in society. (Photo Credit: AFP Photo/Amr Nabil)
Overview
When Iranians went to the polls in February, the turnout was high -- more than 80 percent -- but so were the stakes. Voters weren't just picking a new parliament but resolving a showdown between reformers and proponents of the nation's strict Islamic rule.
In a surprising show of strength, the reformers won 70 percent of the seats, dealing a stunning rebuke to the hard-line Muslim clerics who have been running Iran for two decades. Afterwards, while the winners celebrated, the losers engaged in soul searching -- up to a point.
“We will not change our principles or positions,” declared Mohammad Reza Bahonar, a prominent conservative who lost his seat in parliament, “but it is natural that we should reconsider our policies and methods.” [1]
The election of moderates in Iran surprised many Westerners. After all, isn't this the country that shocked the world in 1979 when radical Muslim clerics overthrew the government? Didn't Iran hold 52 American Embassy personnel hostage for 444 days? And doesn't Iran, to this day, encourage people to chant “Death to America” at political rallies?
To the United States and its allies, Iran is the quintessential example of religious orthodoxy taken to an extreme, more associated with its fatwa (death sentence) against British novelist Salmon Rushdie than democracy. Other rigidly Islamic states, Sudan and Afghanistan among them, are viewed in much the same way. The United States bombed both nations in 1998 after they were linked to anti-American terrorism.
The terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and the World Trade Center in New York City represent the essence of Americans' fear of Islamic fundamentalism: unbending hostility to the West, crippling religious intolerance and a penchant for violence, both at home and abroad.
And yet, unlike most other Muslim states -- including Egypt and other U.S. allies in the Middle East -- fundamentalist Iran allows its citizens to choose freely among candidates with competing agendas. Many experts on the Middle East cite Iran's open elections as proof that Islamic fundamentalism and democracy can peacefully coexist. In fact, giving voters a chance to choose candidates who oppose the status quo, they say, is the ultimate test for a democracy.
Clergymen at the Masourmeh shrine in Qum, Iran, wait in line to vote in last February's parliamentary elections, in which reformers dealt a blow to the strict Islamic government. (AP Photo/Kamran Jebreili)
But others maintain that democracy is inherently impossible for a fundamentalist state like Iran, mainly because many questions that would normally be debated in the political arena have been answered by Islam's holiest book, the Koran.
“For [fundamentalists], the truth is knowable, and so there is no need to discuss it in an open forum,” says Daniel Pipes, director of the Middle East Forum, a think tank in Philadelphia. “That strikes me as undemocratic.”
He notes that Mohammad Khatami may be president but real power lies with “supreme leader” Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who controls the military and other organs of power, including press censorship.
But John Esposito, a professor of religion and international affairs at Georgetown University, is among those who argue that orthodox Islam is not inherently undemocratic. Many references in the Koran and other revered Islamic writings support the notion of representative democracy, he says.
“We assume democracy is impossible in a place like Iran,” Esposito explains, “but it's actually the secular countries in the Muslim world, many of which, like Egypt, are allied with us, that are undemocratic.”
Esposito and others also argue that because the West has misjudged Islamic fundamentalism, Americans, in particular, have “terribly exaggerated” the threat that fundamentalists pose to U.S. security. Much of the exaggeration is due to the news media's tendency to focus only on fundamentalists when there is a bombing, they say.
“They have oversimplified everything to do with Islam,” says Shaul Bakhash, a professor of Middle Eastern history at George Mason University in Fairfax, Va. The reality, Bakhash and others say, is that few fundamentalists actually want to harm the United States. And those that do, he argues, pose only a “minuscule threat” to America, which after all is the world's most powerful nation.
In addition, Bakhash and others say, antagonism among Islamic fundamentalists toward the United States -- largely due to U.S. support for Israel -- has been significantly reduced in the 1990s by the Middle East peace process. “Because the Palestinians and Syrians are talking to the Israelis, things are not as tense as they once were,” says Michael Salla, a professor of international relations at American University.
But hostility toward the United States is seen by others as ingrained in fundamentalist thinking. David Wurmser, a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), contends that fundamentalists desire nothing less than the fall of the West. “I think they see themselves as ideological opposites and say, 'It's either us or them.' ”
In addition, Wurmser and others argue that fundamentalists, far from posing an insignificant threat, have killed many Americans both in the United States and abroad.
“These are dangerous people, and we ignore them at our own peril,” says James Phillips, a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation.
As Americans try to understand Islamic fundamentalism, here are some of the questions being asked:
Is Islamic fundamentalism compatible with democracy?
Most people in the Islamic world do not live under democratic governments. From the sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf to the vast deserts of North Africa, the hallmarks of an open society, like fair elections and respect for the rule of law, are in scant evidence.
There are exceptions. A number of nations, like Jordan and Turkey, have elected parliaments and permit a degree of pluralism. And Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim country, just overturned decades of secular, authoritarian rule and replaced it with a freely elected parliament and president.
Yet these nations are not full democracies, at least in Western terms. For instance, in Turkey, possibly the most westward-looking Muslim country, the political and cultural rights of Kurdish citizens (fully one-fifth of the population) have been severely curtailed. In addition, in 1997, a democratically elected government led by the fundamentalist Welfare Party was forced from power by the Turkish military. Still, Turks at least have had some say in who governs their country.
More typical are nations like Egypt and Tunisia, which have democratic trappings, including an elected president and parliament, but not much real democracy. In Egypt, for example, few opposition candidates are permitted to run, ensuring that the ruling National Democratic Party dominates the legislature. Meanwhile, President Hosni Mubarak, who was re-elected (unopposed) to a fourth six-year term last year, maintains a large state security apparatus to control the opposition. [2]
Egypt's authoritarian model has been duplicated in various degrees throughout the Muslim world, prompting many analysts to question whether Islam and democracy can coexist. The question becomes even more acute when one looks at Islamic fundamentalism.
When fundamentalism grew into a mass political movement in the 1970s and '80s, Western analysts feared that a new generation of repressive theocrats would make traditional Muslim strongmen like Mubarak look as democratic as Thomas Jefferson. And such fears have been borne out in a number of places. Fundamentalist regimes in Sudan and Afghanistan are brutal and undemocratic.
But in Iran, considered the progenitor of all fundamentalist governments, an experiment is under way to show that muscular Islam and democratic traditions are not incompatible. Iran has an elected president and parliament, or Majlis. And, unlike Egypt and many other Muslim states, voters in Iran are not required to rubber stamp the ruling party's choice. In the parliamentary elections in February and the 1997 presidential contest, Iranians chose candidates who were not favored by the religious establishment.
Many scholars say that the election results in Iran prove that Islam and democracy are compatible. But others argue that many aspects of a religiously based political system like Iran's make real democracy impossible. “They are trying to square a circle,” says AEI's Wurmser.
To begin with, they argue, fundamentalist regimes are by their very nature undemocratic because much of the government's structure and policy is based on the Koran, as well as Islamic law, or Shariah. Both sources are thought to come directly from God and hence are hard to question. “The whole essence of Islamic fundamentalist ideology is that truth is derived from the will of Allah, which means that there can never really be free debate on most issues since an answer already exists,” Wurmser argues.
Moreover, Wurmser and others say, when a question arises over whether an answer is correct, it is clerics more than politicians who are relied upon to provide the answer. “It's very much like medieval Europe with its church dogma,” Pipes says. “Many things just aren't open for general discussion.”
And like medieval Europe, they say, Iran and the other fundamentalist regimes directly combine politics and religion, something considered anathema by most democratic states. “When you don't have separation of church and state, there can never be an equality of competing voices since one point of view is more valid than others,” says Lawrence Davidson, an associate professor of history at West Chester University, in West Chester, Pa. “That's not what democracy is about.”
All of this leads to a system that, at best, will be rigged in favor of the status quo. Even in Iran, Davidson and others point out, many powerful governing institutions are not democratic in any way. “All of the levers of power -- military, judiciary, the economy and control over the press -- are in the hands of Khamenei and the mullahs,” Pipes says.
As for the parliament, its authority is very limited and not as democratic as it might seem at first blush. “The Majlis is not really freely elected because all candidates must be approved by the authorities before they can run,” Pipes says. To win this approval, a candidate must show that he or she firmly supports the ideals of the Iranian revolution. Before the election earlier this year, for instance, hundreds of mostly liberal candidates were disqualified.
But others say that results of recent elections in Iran prove that a government run by fundamentalists can be democratic. “Iran is a democracy primarily because the [parliamentary] election turned out the government-backed candidates and that only could have happened in a real democratic state,” says Stephen Pelletiere a professor of national security strategy at the Army War College in Carlyle, Pa.
Pelletiere and others also argue that while screening candidates might not be entirely fair, every democracy tips its hat to the establishment. “Of course, the system is rigged to some extent to favor the powers that be, but so is every democratic system,” he says. “Look at the United States,” Pelletiere adds, pointing to campaign finance laws that many claim stack the deck in favor of incumbents.
Those who believe that democracy and Islam can coexist also discount the idea that a strict separation of church and state is necessary in a democratic system. For instance, they point to Israel, which has a state religion -- Judaism -- but is still considered a democracy.
Supporters of this idea also point out that strict adherence to Islam does not preclude the development of democratic institutions. They note, for example, that the Koran and other important writings can be interpreted to support democracy. “There is a tradition in Islam of consultation, a concept known as ijma, or consensus, that is used to justify a parliamentary form of government,” says Georgetown University's Esposito.
Gary Sick, a professor of Middle Eastern politics at Columbia University, agrees. “A good Muslim can be committed to Islam and to democratic reform because there is plenty of evidence in the Koran and the Shariah for democratic forms of government,” he says. “There is no missing 'democracy gene' in Muslims.”
Indeed, Sick and others argue, it is not Islam that is preventing fundamentalist regimes like those in Afghanistan from democratizing, but more mundane concerns.
“These regimes don't want democracy for the same reason that other authoritarian governments don't: They don't want to lose power,” he says “That's politics, not religion.”
Do Americans exaggerate the dangers Islamic fundamentalism poses to U.S. security?
When many Americans think of Islamic fundamentalism, they think of terrorism and other acts of violence -- and not without some justification. For much of the last 20 years, fundamentalist extremists have kidnapped, hijacked and killed Americans both overseas and at home.
Indeed, when U.S. officials speak of fundamentalist countries, regardless of the context, the specter of terrorism is often invoked. For example, at a Washington conference on American-Iran relations on March 17, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright announced the easing of economic sanctions against Iran. But she still noted pointedly to the audience of academics and diplomats that “innocent Americans and friends of America have been murdered by terrorist groups that are supported by the Iranian government.”
The assault on U.S. citizens and interests by Islamic militants began in 1979, when Iranian students (with their government's blessing) occupied the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days. In the 1980s, Islamic militants were very active, most notably kidnapping and in some cases killing Americans in Beirut throughout much of the decade. The worst of these incidents occurred in 1983, when 241 U.S. Marines died after a suicide bomber destroyed their barracks. [4]
In 1993, fundamentalist violence arrived on U.S. shores when a 1,000-pound bomb exploded in a garage underneath New York's World Trade Center killing six and injuring over 1,000. [5] In August 1998, 257 people were killed -- including 12 Americans -- when U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed by agents thought to be working for Osama bin Laden, a Saudi Arabian fundamentalist operating out of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. [6]
Smoke billows over the heavily damaged U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, on Aug. 7, 1998, after a bomb killed at least 247 people, including 12 Americans. Authorities blamed the attack on Islamic terrorists linked to Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi fundamentalist based in Afghanistan. (AP Photo/Sayyid Azim)
Some Middle East experts see these and other similar incidents as proof of the need to maintain a watchful eye on Islamic fundamentalists throughout the world. “We've been repeatedly burned by these people, and so it's hard to exaggerate the threat they pose to us,” Phillips says.
For one thing, Phillips and others argue, fundamentalists see themselves in direct conflict with the United States and other Western powers. “Their objective is nothing less than the total destruction of the West,” says AEI's Wurmser. “They see no room for peaceful coexistence.”
The desire to destroy the West, Wurmser and others say, stems from a perception held by many fundamentalists that Western, particularly American, ideas and values will destroy Islamic society. “Khomeini called the United States 'the Great Satan' in the sense that the devil destroys you by tempting you,” Phillips says. “They understand the allure of Western culture and see it as a terrible evil.”
But others say fundamentalists are feared primarily because they are misunderstood. “We have a tendency to simplify things and group them together to make them easy to understand,” Bakhash says. “That has certainly happened here.”
Such simplification is driven in part by America's allies in the Muslim world, like Egypt and Turkey, who promote the idea that all fundamentalists are violent. “These regimes find it convenient to label [fundamentalists] as dangerous extremists because it allows them to crack down on them without being criticized by the West,” Esposito says.
The news media are also culpable, Esposito argues. “The media only deal with fundamentalists when there's a bomb involved,” he says. “No wonder Americans think they're all terrorists, when they bother to think about them at all.” The reality, he and others claim, is that the vast majority of Islamic fundamentalists are peace-loving people of faith.
Finally, many Middle East experts argue, even violent fundamentalists are incapable of actually threatening U.S. security. “This is not China or Russia we're talking about,” Bakhash says. “These are small groups and small states capable of creating small amounts of mischief, nothing more.”
Pelletierre agrees: “To say that Osama Bin Laden is a threat to us is ridiculous, given that we're the most powerful nation on Earth, and he's one forlorn individual hiding out in a godforsaken place like Afghanistan.”
But Phillips, Wurmser and others dispute the notion that fundamentalists are not a valid threat to American security. “These are very nasty people who are capable of doing very nasty things,” Phillips says. “I mean, look at how many people they killed in the African embassy bombings,” he adds. [7]
And the problem isn't just with terrorists, they point out. Countries like Iran and Sudan have repeatedly been accused of aiding or even directing these violent groups. Other states in the Muslim world, while not directly assisting Islamic terrorists, do offer tacit support to these groups. “Many Muslim governments don't dissociate themselves from this bad behavior,” Wurmser says, “and so they are in a sense responsible for it.”
If the United States and her allies dismiss the threat posed by these groups and their backers, they do so at their own peril, Phillips argues. “Look, we're going to get burned again by these people,” he says. “It's better to try to deal with this reality than to ignore it.”
[1] Quoted in Susan Sachs, “Many Iranian Conservatives Lose Seats,” The New York Times, Feb. 23, 2000.
[2] “Mubarak Reelected With 94% of Vote,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 28, 1999.
[4] Mary H. Cooper, “Combating Terrorism,” The CQ Researcher, July 21, 1995, pp. 633-656.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Pamela Constable and Kamran Khan, “Suspect Links Embassy Blast To Saudi Exile,” The Washington Post, Aug. 17, 1998.
[7] Ibid.
Background
An Islamic Revival
The history of Islam, like that of most major faiths, is replete with attempts to return the religion to its roots, usually in response to some sort of crisis. The most recent strain of fundamentalism has its roots in a calamity of the 19th century: the triumph of European colonialism. By the beginning of the 20th century, all of Muslim Africa and most of the Islamic lands of Central and South Asia had European overlords.
Muslims responded to this new reality in two ways. Some called on their brothers and sisters to imitate European ways in an effort to replicate European power. These “Westernizers” wanted to build secular societies where Islam and politics were separate. But others argued that European methods should only be used in the context of Islam. According to Davidson, the “Islamic modernizers” viewed Western political, educational and other models as a means to “revive” Islamic civilization, not supplant it with a European substitute. [8]
As the 20th century dawned, the Westernizers, with European support, began to gain the upper hand. This trend gathered speed after World War I, when the breakup of the Turkish-based Ottoman Empire created a series of new Muslim states, such as Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. As would happen with decolonization in Africa a half-century later, the new countries were drawn up by Westerners with little attention paid to the different peoples who would have to live together in these new political entities. In fact, the basic concept of a nation-state, as conceived in the West, flies in the face of Muslim tradition, which stresses a collective identity based on Islam. [9]
The breakup of the Muslim world into nation-states further accelerated after World War II, when French and British colonies in North Africa and elsewhere gained independence. In most cases secular, Western-influenced elites ran these new countries.
During these years, a number of other influences came to the fore, most notably Arab nationalism and socialism. But by the late 1960s these and other secular models began to fray as Muslims became disenchanted with governments that were increasingly corrupt and unable to improve people's lives.
It was at this time that fundamentalism began to seriously compete for the hearts and minds of many Muslims. The fundamentalist movement had existed for some time, but on a grass-roots and largely humanitarian level. Throughout the Islamic world, Muslim societies had been working for decades to provide everything from health care to religious and cultural education in tens of thousands of neighborhoods and communities. [10] Now the influence of this loose, informal network started to grow.
In 1979, fundamentalist Islam scored its first major political victory when Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran was overthrown by a popular uprising inspired and led by a leading Muslim cleric, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In place of the secular, pro-Western Shah, Khomeini created a theocracy, asserting in 1979 that “there is not a single topic of human life for which Islam has not provided instruction and established norms.” [11]
The Iranians sought to stoke the fires of Islamic revolution throughout the Muslim world. In Lebanon, for instance, they provided military and other assistance to Hezbollah (Party of God), which is still fighting to establish an Islamic state. But more than providing direct aid, Iran inspired Islamic fundamentalists everywhere, from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan to the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria.
And Iran was not the only country to establish a fundamentalist government. In 1989, a military coup in Sudan overthrew a civilian government and established a new regime led by Hasan al-Turabi, an Islamic fundamentalist and law professor.
In Afghanistan, a group of ultra-orthodox Muslims, the Taliban, came to power in 1996 after nearly 17 years of war following invasion by the Soviet Union in 1979. The Taliban instituted a particularly strict brand of Shariah, forcing women to be fully covered in public and denying them access to education. In addition, TV, film and music were banned. [12]
[8] Lawrence Davidson, Islamic Fundamentalism (1998), p. 11.
[9] Ibid., p. 12.
[10] John Eposito, The Oxford History of Islam (1999), p. 656.
[11] Quoted in Dan Diller (ed.), The Middle East (1994), p. 219.
[12] Esposito, op. cit., p. 560.
Chronology
1960s-1970s
Government corruption and inefficiency in the Muslim world lead to disenchantment and rising fundamentalism.
1967
Israel wins the Six-Day War, prompting much soul searching among Muslims.
1970
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the father of modern Arab nationalism, dies.
1977
Gen. Zia ul-Haq overthrows Pakistan's civilian government and introduces Islamic law.
1979
Fundamentalists in Iran overthrow the ruling Shah.
1980s
The Iranian revolution inspires many strict Islamic movements throughout the Muslim world.
1980
Hezbollah (Party of God) is founded in Lebanon.
1981
Islamic militants assassinate Egyptian President Sadat.
1989
After a coup, Hassan al-Turabi establishes an Islamic government in Sudan.
1990s
Islamic fundamentalists suffer setbacks.
1990
Islamic fundamentalists win 32 seats in Jordanian parliament.
1992
Algeria aborts national elections to thwart Islamic fundamentalists, sparking civil war.
1993
Islamic militants bomb the World Trade Center in New York City killing six people.
1994
The Taliban begin a military campaign to unify Afghanistan and establish an Islamic state.
1995
The Welfare Party in Turkey forms an Islamic government, but is ousted by the military.
May 1997
Reformer Mohammad Khatami is elected president in Iran.
November 1997
Islamic extremists kill 58 tourists in Luxor, turning many Egyptians against fundamentalists.
1998
Saudi fundamentalist Osama bin Laden is linked to the bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa.
1999
Hassan al-Turabi is removed as Speaker of Sudan's parliament.
February 2000
Reformers allied with Khatami win convincingly in Iran.
March 17, 2000
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright lifts some economic sanctions against Iran.
Current Situation
Struggle for Power
Every Muslim country from Morocco to Indonesia has its share of Islamic fundamentalists. In most of these states, fundamentalism is a potent political and cultural force. And in a few nations, like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Afghanistan, fundamentalists have actually come to power. Fundamentalists in Iran and Afghanistan took control by overthrowing the existing order, while their counterparts in Saudi Arabia have been the existing order.
Other countries, like Jordan and Pakistan, have accommodated orthodox Islamic political movements by allowing them to compete in elections. In Jordan, for instance, the Muslim Brotherhood won enough seats in parliamentary elections to join the governing coalition in 1991. [13]
But not all countries have accommodated Islam at the ballot box. Some states, fearful of violent revolution, have suppressed fundamentalist movements. Algeria and Egypt used their militaries to keep fundamentalists at bay.
In Algeria in 1991, the government canceled national elections after the first round of voting because a fundamentalist party, the Islamic Salvation Front, was poised to take power.
The Egyptian government has also been cracking down on fundamentalists, although less severely. Unlike Algeria, Egypt has never even scheduled, let alone held, an election that would give Islamic fundamentalists a chance to win any real power. And while it has not fallen into civil war, the nation has at times been wracked by fundamentalist-inspired violence. For instance, in 1997, radicals killed 58 foreign tourists in Luxor. [14]
Some Middle East experts see the crackdowns, especially in Algeria, as a necessary response to a valid threat. They argue that Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front never would have submitted itself to another vote if it had come to power in 1991. “The Islamists in Algeria weren't democrats and were only using the election to take power,” says George Mason's Bakhash. “They almost certainly wouldn't have allowed themselves to be turned out by the electorate.”
In addition, Bakhash and others say, the militants in Algeria attempted to create violent unrest in an effort to overthrow the government. “These are very dangerous groups we are talking about,” says Jeffrey Kemp, director of regional strategic programs at the Nixon Center. “They have killed a lot of people over the years.”
As a result, some experts say, the Algerian government had no choice but to use violence to suppress violence. “They did exactly the right thing in Algeria when they crushed the Islamist rebels,” Wurmser says, adding that the government should have introduced “rapid economic and political liberalization” at the same time. “That's really where they failed, and that's why [the war] is still going on.”
Even in Egypt, where radicals were less of a threat than in Algeria, suppression of the more violent elements was necessary, some analysts say. “The Egyptian response was correct, because they focused on crushing the most dangerous fundamentalists while working to retain the support of other religious people,” Phillips says. “Most fundamentalists in Egypt, especially after Luxor, now realize how dangerous the most violent elements within their movement are and have come to support the government's efforts against them.”
But others say that violent reactions by these regimes, especially in Algeria, have been misguided and much too heavy-handed. “The [Algerian] Islamic Salvation Front was a diverse, broad-based group that was participating in the democratic process, and the military brutally suppressed them and drove them underground,” says Georgetown's Esposito. “Only then did they resort to violence.”
Those who oppose the crackdowns also argue that it is premature to assume the worst about Islamic fundamentalists. “One cannot say how one group will behave once in power, but the Islamists have not received a fair hearing on this issue,” says Bahman Baktiari, a professor of political science at the American University in Cairo. Baktiari points out that it was the government, not the fundamentalists, who acted in an undemocratic manner when they cancelled an election they thought they were going to lose. “So which one is legitimate?” he asks. “A government that rejects the results of an election if they don't like it or the argument that if the Islamists win they will violate the process?”
Even if the fundamentalists had anti-democratic tendencies, the government still should have allowed them to take power, Esposito says. “The Front was in no position to run away with democracy because the military always had the power to step in and restore the status quo.”
[13] “Islam's Arab Backlash,” The Economist, Nov. 27, 1999.
[14] John Daniszewski, “Islamic Group Taunts Egyptian President After Massacre,” Los Angeles Times, Nov. 21, 1997.
Pro-Con
Should the United States try to establish closer ties with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan?
Lawrence Davidson
Diplomatic relations establish lines of communication between governments. They allow for the promotion and protection of national interests, including trade, assistance of citizens abroad, cultural interchange and the encouragement of mutually acceptable standards of behavior. Historically, diplomatic relations also have facilitated the settling of disputes between countries, short of war. Thus, it can be argued that diplomatic relations are most necessary and useful when exercised between states with significant differences.This argument supports a position that the United States should have diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The Taliban have demonstrated that they control most of the territory of Afghanistan, and they have established governing institutions for that land. Assuredly, their policies are not to our liking, particularly on human rights.If we had diplomatic relations, we could more effectively communicate our disagreement with Taliban policies and encourage more acceptable ones. There is plenty of precedent for this. The United States has, in the past, and continues today, to have diplomatic relations with less than friendly countries governed by regimes with poor human rights records. In many cases, our government uses the argument above to defend having these relations.What has the absence of diplomatic relations with Afghanistan accomplished for the United States? Have we been able to influence the Taliban in any positive way? Some American leaders have suggested applying economic penalties against Afghanistan rather than establishing and working through diplomatic relations. However, this approach has two flaws. First, in Afghanistan we have a regime that is ideologically and religiously committed to principles that are more important to them than economics. Economic sanctions are unlikely to sway the leadership.Second, as is tragically clear from the case of Iraq, the use of economic sanctions can have a devastating impact on the general population of the country against which they are imposed. That means that, as perpetrators of such a strategy, the human rights record of the United States becomes as dismal as those we oppose.U.S. national interests can only benefit from the establishment of diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Doing so cannot harm them. Nor are there any good alternatives for bringing positive pressure to bear on the Taliban regime. Diplomatic relations should therefore be established. |
Yehudit Barsky
While diplomatic relations are the essence of statecraft, there are particular instances where limiting the level of diplomatic ties between states is useful for encouraging changes in foreign policy. In the case of Afghanistan, the current U.S. policy of withholding official recognition of the Taliban government sends a strong message that Afghanistan must change its current policy of providing shelter for Usama bin Laden and other terrorists.The singular focus of the Taliban's foreign policy since its takeover of Afghanistan in 1996 has been achieving international legitimacy. The only countries that have recognized the Taliban are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan. Contrary to the perception that Afghanistan has been treated as a pariah by the United States are the numerous contacts between American representatives and the Taliban. That same year, the Clinton administration dispatched then U.N. Representative Bill Richardson to Afghanistan to help persuade the Taliban and their political opponents to hold direct negotiations in an effort to end their civil war.Contacts have increased over the past two years, particularly because of Afghanistan's continued sheltering of bin Laden. From the U.S. perspective, the discussions have focused on extraditing bin Laden and dismantling his Al-Qa'ida organization and other terrorist groups.Other concerns include the development of Afghanistan over the past few years as the world's No. 1 producer of opium, and human rights issues such as the banning of education for women. Thus far, the Taliban have rejected the U.S. extradition request, and relations with Afghanistan have been downgraded to include the imposition of U.N economic sanctions.Bin Laden's stated goal is to carry out acts of war against Americans. He has demonstrated his capability to send operatives from Al-Qa'ida to mount such attacks. Since the Taliban claim to control most of Afghanistan, they bear responsibility for the continued operation of bin Laden's organizational infrastructure, which they assert is independent of their regime.Throughout its contacts with Afghanistan, the United States has withheld official recognition of the Taliban to tell them that they cannot have it both ways. They can demonstrate that they control their territory and turn over bin Laden, thus opening the door to official recognition, or continue on the path toward increased isolation. |
Outlook
A Spent Force?
The last five years have not been good ones for fundamentalists. In Iran, the conservative clerics are under increasing challenge. Meanwhile, secular governments in Egypt, Tunisia and even Algeria have largely suppressed political Islam. Fundamentalists also seem on the defensive in Sudan, where the nation's premier Islamist, Speaker of the Parliament Turabi, recently was forced from power. Even the monarchy in peaceful Saudi Arabia is thought to be vulnerable, as an increasingly westernized population calls for more personal freedom and democracy.
“Extremist political Islam has failed because it has not been able to deliver the goods anywhere it has been in power,” says the Nixon Center's Kemp. “People in the Islamic world, especially young people, realize that this romance with the past doesn't make their lives better.”
Kemp and others say that the disenchantment is especially evident in Iran. “It's clear to everyone that people in Iran don't like the mullahs and no longer accept the government's rationalization that their problems are caused by the United States and the West,” says AEI's Wurmser.
This rejection is a troubling development for fundamentalists, Kemp and Wurmser say, because Iran's 21-year theocratic experiment has been an inspiration to fundamentalists around the world.
Strict Islamic governments in other countries, notably Afghanistan and, until recently, Sudan, are faring even worse than their counterparts in Iran. Sudan's experiment with fundamentalism has made the East African country a pariah. Meanwhile, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has done virtually nothing to improve the lot of the people.
But others argue that while fundamentalists in certain states may be in trouble, fundamentalism itself is unlikely to disappear any time soon.
“Fundamentalism will never be a spent force because there will always be people in the Muslim world who will want to apply the Koran to everyday life,” says American University's Salla. “In every country where the government isn't able to provide its citizens with the services they need, there will be fundamentalism because religious thinkers usually offer utopian solutions to problems, and that is very appealing to desperate people.”
Others agree that while fundamentalism is not about to fade away, it already is transforming itself from a violent movement. “The enthusiasm for revolution throughout the Islamic world of the 1970s and '80s is gone,” Dunn says. “They are starting to focus less on the top and more on the bottom, on grass-roots efforts aimed at making society more religious.”
So far, this strategy seems to be working, says Michael Dunn, editor of the Middle East Journal. “Countries with secular governments are more religious than they were even 20 years ago,” he says. “And so these movements, instead of being revolutionary, are becoming evolutionary, pushing for incremental change.”
Efforts to bring Islam more into everyday life generally have not been resisted by these secular countries, even those that tried to crush Islamic radicals. For instance, Dunn says, Egypt and Tunisia are trying to accommodate the increasingly religious nature of society by building more mosques and taking into account the religious implications of new policies.
This new spirit of accommodation is likely to lead to a kinder, gentler form of fundamentalism in the future, Georgetown's Esposito says. “I see Islamic fundamentalism becoming much more progressive, much more tolerant.”
Footnotes
[1] Quoted in Susan Sachs, “Many Iranian Conservatives Lose Seats,” The New York Times, Feb. 23, 2000.
[2] “Mubarak Reelected With 94% of Vote,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 28, 1999.
[3] “The People Against the Mullahs,” The Economist, Feb. 19, 2000.
[4] Mary H. Cooper, “Combating Terrorism,” The CQ Researcher, July 21, 1995, pp. 633-656.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Pamela Constable and Kamran Khan, “Suspect Links Embassy Blast To Saudi Exile,” The Washington Post, Aug. 17, 1998.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Lawrence Davidson, Islamic Fundamentalism (1998), p. 11.
[9] Ibid., p. 12.
[10] John Eposito, The Oxford History of Islam (1999), p. 656.
[11] Quoted in Dan Diller (ed.), The Middle East (1994), p. 219.
[12] Esposito, op. cit., p. 560.
[13] “Islam's Arab Backlash,” The Economist, Nov. 27, 1999.
[14] John Daniszewski, “Islamic Group Taunts Egyptian President After Massacre,” Los Angeles Times, Nov. 21, 1997.
Bibliography
Books
Davidson, Lawrence, Islamic Fundamentalism, Greenwood Press, 1998.
Davidson, an associate professor of history at West Chester University, has written a clear and insightful introduction to Islamic fundamentalism. In addition to explaining its history and importance, Davidson includes a generous appendix of primary documents, from selections from the Koran to a speech by Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Diller, Daniel, The Middle East, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1994.
A slightly dated but still useful guide to the politics and culture of the Middle East, including a number of chapters that deal with Islamic fundamentalism.
Esposito, John L., The Oxford History of Islam, Oxford University Press, 1999.
Esposito, a professor of religion and international affairs at Georgetown University, has put together a series of essays chronicling the history of Islamic civilization from the days of Mohammad to the present. Esposito's own contribution, a chapter on contemporary Islam, explains the impact of today's fundamentalist movement on the Muslim world.
Mackey, Sandra, The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a New Nation, Plume Press, 1998.
Mackey, an Atlanta-based expert on the Middle East, provides an in-depth look at the Iran of yesterday and today. Her chapters on the Iranian revolution and its aftermath are detailed and insightful.
Articles
“Islam's Arab Backlash: Defeated in Battle, Ignored in Politics, Islamists May be Gaining Ground in Arab Society,” The Economist, Nov. 27, 1999.
The article argues that fundamentalists in many countries have given up dreams of revolution in exchange for a strategy of suffusing society with Islamic strictures.
“The People Against the Mullahs,” The Economist, Feb. 19, 2000.
The piece focuses on Iran to illustrate the challenges of trying to establish a democratic system within a strict Islamic state.
Burns, John F., “A Time of Testing for Islamic Zeal,” The New York Times, Feb. 20, 2000.
Journalist Burns argues that Islamic fundamentalism faces the possibility of decline, as voices of moderation grow louder in Iran, Lebanon and other nations where fundamentalist fervor is waning.
Masci, David, “Reform in Iran,” The CQ Researcher, Dec. 18, 1998.
Masci explores the political and cultural landscape in Iran soon after the election of moderate President Muhammad Khatami.
Rieff, David, “Millimeter by Millimeter,” Newsweek, Jan. 1, 2000.
Rieff says that President Khatami of Iran is not trying to change that country's theocratic system, as many believe, but save it through reform. He argues that a good parallel is the Soviet Union's Mikhail Gorbachev, who tried to reform his country in an effort revitalize communism, not destroy it.
Next Step
Islamic Fundamentalism
Constable, Pamela, “In Pakistan, Hold on Power Grows Tenuous; Prime Minister Weathers Economic Woes, Army Dissent, Foreign Demands,” The Washington Post, Oct. 10, 1999, p. A29.
The government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is facing a cacophony of domestic and foreign pressures, its worst crisis since he took power in early1997.Almost its only defender is the Clinton administration, which wants to see Pakistani democracy preserved even if it means sustaining this deeply unpopular government.
Constable, Pamela, “Regional Stability Casualty of Coup,” The Washington Post, Oct. 13, 1999.
The military coup in Pakistan is a serious setback for both secular democracy and for stability in the volatile subcontinent, where both Pakistan and its longtime rival India have tested nuclear weapons and missiles in the past 18 months. Although prompted largely by a power struggle between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf, the head of the armed forces, the coup could have far-reaching implications in the disputed Kashmir region, where Pakistan and India fought a 10-week border war this year.
DeYoung, Karen, “An Uncharitable Dispute; Relief Organizations Want U.S. Government To Moderate Hard-Line Stance on Sudan,” The Washington Post, Jan. 5, 2000, p. A15.
For decades, Save the Children has been aiding young victims of Africa's longest-running conflict -- the civil war in Sudan. Now, however, the Connecticut aid organization has expanded into unprecedented political activism at home. Save the Children has joined most of the private and religion-based aid agencies that operate a $1 million-a-day relief program in Sudan in beginning to criticize Clinton administration policy as one-sided in its hostility toward the Khartoum government and insufficiently committed to promoting a just peace.
Pomfret, John, “Separatists Defy Chinese Crackdown; Persistent Islamic Movement May Have Help From Abroad,” The Washington Post, Jan. 26, 2000, p. A17.
Despite a police crackdown, unrest in China's northwestern territory of Xinjiang appears to have intensified, fomented by ethnic tensions, strong-arm Chinese tactics and the pull of Islamic fundamentalism. A classified circular issued in December by the Ministry of State Security indicated strongly that China believes problems with Uighurs -- mostly Muslims with a Turkic language and ethnically different from the majority Han Chinese -- will not go away. Sources said the circular ordered security agents to prepare to report on attempts to infiltrate China by Islamic militants from Saudi Arabia, Iran, other Persian Gulf Arab states, Turkey and India.
Islamic Terrorism
“Indian Muslims Condemn Hijacking as 'Anti-Islamic,'”, Agence France Presse, Dec. 30, 1999.
The deputy cleric of India's best-known mosque and senior Muslim leaders condemned as “anti-Islamic” the hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane by Muslim militants. Syed Ahmed Bukhari, deputy priest of New Delhi's medieval Jama Masjid mosque, told a news conference that Indian Muslims were solidly behind the government in its efforts to resolve the weeklong crisis.
Craig Pyes, “Radical Islamic Network May Have Come to U.S.,” The New York Times, Dec. 31, 1999, p. 16.
Authorities say the Armed Islamic Group, or GIA, a guerrilla organization fighting an Islamic holy war against the military-dominated government of Algeria, may have reached United States after establishing itself in Western Europe, Afghanistan, Turkey and Bosnia. They cite a series of arrests beginning with that of Ahmed Ressam in Port Angeles, Wash., on Dec. 14.
De Roquefeuil, Christopher, “Washington Moves to Reassure U.S. Muslim Community Amid Terrorism Fears,” Agence France Presse, Dec. 23, 1999.
Amid increasing fears of possible terrorist attacks on U.S. targets, American officials and Muslims in the United States are moving to prevent a backlash against the Islamic community. Allegations against Islamic militant Osama bin Laden, the recent arrests of his suspected followers in Jordan and the detention of an Algerian man for smuggling explosives into the United States from Canada have all contributed to the potential for a backlash against American Muslims.
Schweid, Barry, “Muslim Council Leader Hails U.S. Response to Complaints, Travel Warnings,” The Washington Post, Dec. 28, 1999, p. A21.
The leader of a U.S. Muslim group says that recent State Department travel warnings are beginning to separate terrorist threats from Islam, “a positive response” to repeated complaints. Recent advisories were “very positive in de-linking the issue of terrorism from faith,” said Aly Abuzaakouk, executive director of the American Muslim Council and one of several Muslim Americans invited to dinner last week by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright.
Truehart, Charles, “Group Tied to Border Suspects Has Kept Attacks Close to Home; Terrorism in U.S. Would Be New Front for Algerian Extremists,” The Washington Post, Dec. 31, 1999, p. A28.
The Armed Islamic Group is the principal Muslim underground organization waging war against the Algerian government. If the group or its sympathizers are involved in trying to export terrorism to the United States, as U.S. prosecutors suggest, it would mark a radical departure from the group's focus on Algeria. Until now, France has been the only country that has been victimized by exported Algerian terrorism. France is the former colonial power in Algeria and was strongly identified with the military-backed Algerian government opposed by Islamic militants.
Shariah
“Nigerian Leaders Agree to Hold Off Enforcement of Muslim Law,” The New York Times, March 1, 2000, p. 4.
The government and leaders from the mostly Muslim north agreed to back away from calls for strict Islamic law in an effort to end the violence that has wracked Nigeria for a week. The informal agreement, reached by President Olusegun Obasanjo and the northern leaders in Abuja, the capital, said states that already had Islamic law, or Shariah, would stop enforcing it. States seeking to put Shariah into effect would not adopt it for now.
“Pregnant Indonesian maid to be stoned to death,” Agence France Presse, Feb. 28, 2000.
An Islamic tribunal in the United Arab Emirates has ordered a pregnant Indonesian maid to be stoned to death for adultery, a newspaper reported Monday. The same court in the Indian Ocean emirate of Fujairah acquitted her Muslim Indian lover in absentia, Al-Khaleej daily said. The man has reportedly fled the country. But 35-year-old Karteen Karikender received the maximum sentence from the court. She was arrested after the police were informed she was pregnant out of wedlock.
“Zia Decrees Islamic Law To Be Supreme in Pakistan,” The Washington Post, June 16, 1988, p. A32.
President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq decreed a sweeping law today that brings every facet of life in Pakistan under the direct supervision of fundamentalist Islamic scholars and priests. Zia, who dismissed his Cabinet and dissolved the National Assembly, said the new law was to take effect immediately. He said he “bowed in gratitude to almighty Allah” for giving him the power to enact a law that the legislature had rejected as unworkable.
Onishi, Norimitsu, “New Strife Tests Nigeria's Fragile Democracy,” The New York Times, March 15, 2000, p. 1.
Nigeria Kaduna has become the epicenter of a national battle that on the surface is over states' right to adopt Islamic law, but which is really about raw political power in Africa's most populous country. The future of Nigeria, the most fragile of democracies, might be decided in this battle. President Olusegun Obasanjo, who has surprised many by the breadth and aggressiveness of his democratic reforms, is facing the most serious threat to his 10-month presidency. Some members of the northern Muslim elite -- which ruled Nigeria for most of its history but has found its power greatly diminished under Obasanjo, a Christian - seem to have seized on religion to galvanize their forces and challenge the federal government.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
Hundley, Tom, “Iran Slowly Opening Doors; The Winds of Change Are Not Yet a Gale, But the Country's Voters Are Breathing Life Into Reform,” Chicago Tribune, Feb. 20, 2000, p. 3.
During his exile in Paris, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini used cassette tapes smuggled into Iran to stoke the fires of a revolution. If Khomeini were alive today, he would no doubt have a Web site. Not so his successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Most Iranians would say it is highly unlikely that Khamenei has ever cracked a laptop. President Mohammad Khatami, on the other hand, knows all about the Internet. You can e-mail him at khatami@president.ir. Khamenei and Khatami are the two most powerful political figures in Iran today. Although both wear the black clerical turban that signifies genealogical lineage to the Prophet Mohammad, they represent sharply divergent paths of the revolution that transformed the Islamic world a generation ago.
Schneider, Howard, “Iran's Supreme Leader May Have to Follow Khamenei and Other Conservative Clerics; Will Be Key to the Pace of Reforms,” The Washington Post, Feb. 27, 2000, p. A25.
To the strictest followers of Iran's Islamic system, supreme spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is a man beyond criticism, appointed to safeguard religious rules and given power over institutions such as the country's defense forces and broadcasting system. However, to his younger brother Hadi Khamenei, a reformer just elected to parliament, the leader is a man who grew up with no special claim to piety or insight. Hadi Khamenei said that as children in the 1950s, he, his brother and six other siblings enjoyed raising birds and playing sports, and were not pushed by their father into religious studies.
Schneider, Howard, “Spin Doctors in Iran; Reformists Adopt U.S. Campaign Tactics,” The Washington Post, Feb. 18, 2000, p. A1.
They read American political journals to glean campaign tactics, use modern polling techniques to hone their message and offer alluring close-up photos of their leading candidates. If Iran's burgeoning reform movement claims a large number of the seats in parliamentary elections as expected, much of the credit will go to a clique of strategists who figured out they could use modern political tactics in what is still a somewhat closed environment to tap the energy and interest of Iranian youth.
Contacts
The Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding
Georgetown University, 37th & O Sts., Washington, D.C. 20057
(202) 687-8375
www.cmcu.net
The center's purpose is to achieve a better understanding between Islam and Christianity and between the Muslim world and the West.
Middle East Institute
1761 N. St. N.W., Washington D.C. 20036
(202) 785-1141
www.mideasti.org/mei
The institute seeks to broaden knowledge of the Middle East through research, conferences and seminars.
Muslim Public Affairs Council
923 National Press Building, 529 14th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20045
(202) 879-6726
www.mpac.org
The council represents the interests of Muslims in the United States.
The Nixon Center
1615 L St. N.W., Suite 1250, Washington D.C. 20036
(202) 887-1000
www.nixoncenter.org
The center conducts research on foreign policy issues through the prism of American national interest.
Washington Institute for Near East Policy
1828 L St. N.W., Washington D.C. 20036
(202) 452-0650
www.washingtoninstitute.org
The research and educational organization promotes debate on Near East policy.
Special Focus
There is no word in Arabic for fundamentalism. “The closest that we have is usuliyan, which means principalist,” says Ebrahim Moosa, an associate professor of religion at Stanford University.
In fact, says Bahman Baktiari, a political science professor at the American University in Cairo, Islamic fundamentalism is a purely Western construct, “used to describe the rise of Islamic forces in the Middle East.”
Moreover, Baktiari says, “this movement is not homogeneous.” From North Africa to Asia, fundamentalists have different views about how to build a good Islamic society. For instance, in Iran, women can attend school, drive, vote and even hold public office. By contrast, women in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan can't.“
Still, several common assumptions and principals underlie almost all fundamentalist, or Islamist, movements. Indeed, like orthodox movements within other faiths, Islamic fundamentalism took hold because of what some Muslims see as a crisis of epic proportions -- namely, the state of confusion and decay in the Muslim world. The answer, they believe, is to return religion to its proper place of importance in society.
“God has not forsaken Muslims,” the fundamentalists often say, “rather Muslims have forsaken God.” [1]
A millennium ago, Islam was the foundation of the most dynamic civilization in the world. While the Christian West was still trying to recover from the fall of the Roman Empire, Arabs throughout North Africa and the Levant were building a sophisticated and energetic culture. But after several hundred years of prosperity, the Muslim world went into decline, increasingly beset by the military, economic and cultural power of Europe and, later, the United States. To make matters worse, Islamic fundamentalists say Muslim countries have been shamelessly forsaking their own glorious culture and replacing it with shallow, if not obscene, Western notions.
The first step on the road to reversing this decline, fundamentalists say, is to cast off Western music, literature and other influences.
“They want to do away with Michael Jackson and Madonna, this hedonistic culture that has been imposed on them,” says Seyyed Hossein Nasr, a professor of Islamic studies at The George Washington University.
Fundamentalists also want to re-examine Western institutions and law. “The idea of the all-powerful state, which now exists in most Muslim countries, is also Western and alien to Islam,” Nasr says. “Fundamentalists want peace and security like everyone else, but they don't want a government that meddles in their lives so much.”
In place of Western culture and institutions, funda-mentalists call for a return to a society based on Islam at all levels. “This is about Islam being part of public norms, in the political, economic and cultural spheres,” Moosa says.
For the individual, this means finding homegrown alternatives to Western imports. “We need to reassert our identity,” Nasr says. “And so instead of reading, say, a French book or an American book, we need to be looking to our own literature.”
Music, fashion, cuisine, architecture and other aspects of culture must also reflect the influence of Islam. “Islamicizing society means a lot of things, from getting rid of pornography to making women wear chador [a head scarf to cover one's hair] to banning alcohol,” says Daniel Pipes, president of the Middle East Forum in Philadelphia.
On the political level, a return to Islam entails infusing public institutions with religion. “All public life in Islam is religious, being permeated by the experience of the Divine,” writes Hasan al-Turabi, who in 1989 engineered Sudan's experiment with an Islamic government. “Its function is to pursue the service of Allah as expressed in a concrete way in the Shariah, the religious law.” [2]
But the meaning of the Koran, is, to some degree, dependent on who is reading it. “There are many different ways to interpret the Shariah,” Moosa says. “Each group calibrates their reading of things based on local conditions.”
In rough-and-tumble Afghanistan, for instance, the Taliban interpret the texts rather harshly. “But Iran is more cosmopolitan,” Moosa says, “and it does not see things in such a Draconian way.”
[1] Lawrence Davidson, Islamic Fundamentalism (1998), p. 83.
[2] Quoted in Ibid., p. 127.