The Choices Justices Make is a groundbreaking work that offers a strategic account of Supreme Court decision making. Justices realize that their ability to achieve their policy and other goals depends on the preferences of other actors, the choices they expect others to make, and the institutional context in which they act. All these factors hold sway over justices as they make their decisions, from which cases to accept, to how to interact with their colleagues, and what policies to adopt in their opinions.

Choices is a thought-provoking, yet nontechnical work that is an ideal supplement for judicial process and public law courses. In addition to offering a unique and sustained theoretical account, the authors tell a fascinating story of how the Court works. Data culled from the Court's public records and from the private papers of Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Powell provide empirical evidence to support the central argument, while numerous examples from the justices' papers animate the work.

Tables and Figures
Preface

1. A Strategic Account of Judicial Decisions
   Overview of the Strategic Account
   Major Components of the Strategic Account
   Conclusion



2. Justices as Policy Seekers
   Reasonableness of Policy Assumption
   Exclusive Focus on Policy Goals
   Attainment of Goals



3. Strategic Interaction
   Bargaining
   Forward Thinking
   Manipulating the Agenda
   Strategic Opinion Writing



4. The Institutional Context I
   Institutions and the Formation of Expectations
   The Internal Institutions of the Court



5. The Institutional Context II
   Separation of Powers
   The Court and the American People



6. Implications of the Strategic Account
   Implications for the Emergence of Law
   Implications for the Future Sudy of Courts and Law

Appendix
Index

"Epstein and Knight have written a most informative, creative, and insightful study. It expertly weaves new and existing information to illustrate strategic political decision making by Supreme Court justices. The book is a first-rate creative intellectual exercise that is remarkably free of the jargon of economics."

- Richard A. Brisbin, West Virginia University

"Epstein and Knight wade into the debate about whether judges think and act strategically to further their contested interpretations of legal principles and rules. Choices systematically provides clear and convincing evidence, supported by equally clear and convincing reasoning, that judges can and do think and act strategically. Those who disagree will have to deny that evidence and reason are valid intellectual instruments--or invent tons of new data."

"The Choices Justices Make" represents a new generation in judicial scholarship. Epstein and Knight's emphasis on strategic interaction provides a new perspective on a range of problems."

"Choices is a terrific book! . . . Its clarity and focus make it easily accessible to even a reader like myself who is not a follower of positive theory . . . There were times when I couldn't put the book down. . . . In many ways Choices is foundational. . . . It has the potential to become a classic."

"A worthy successor to Walter Murphy's masterful Elements of Judicial Strategy."

Lee Epstein is the Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University. She is also a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the American Academy of Political and Social Science. She received her Ph.D. from Emory University. She is coauthor of The Supreme Court and Legal Change: Abortion and the Death Penalty (1992) with Joseph Kobylka; Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial Appointments (2005) with Jeffrey A. Segal; The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions, and Developments, 4th ed. (2007) with Segal, Harold J. Spaeth, and Thomas G. Walker; and The Choices Justices Make (1998) with Jack Knight, which won the C. Herman Pritchett Award for the best book on law and courts. In addition, she is coauthor, with Walter F. Murphy and C. Herman Pritchett of Courts, Judges and Politics, 6th ed. (2006).

Jack Knight is professor in the political science department, a fellow of the Center for Political Economy, and a member of the Committee on Social Thought and Analysis at Washington University. He is the author of Institutions and Social Conflict and co-editor of Explaining Social Institutions with Itai Sened.