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SAGE Publications

Cover Image: Lobbying and Policymaking: The Public Pursuit of Private Interests
  • Date: 09/25/2012
  • Format: Print Paperback
  • Price: $38.00
  • ISBN: 9781604264692
  • Pages: 214
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Lobbying and Policymaking: The Public Pursuit of Private Interests
R. Kenneth Godwin
Scott Ainsworth
Erik K. Godwin


Spurred by the disconnect between what was being taught in the classroom and actual practice, Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin set out to answer the question, “Was political science missing some key aspects of the interactions between lobbyists and policy makers?” Built on interviews with over 100 lobbyists, these authors show that much of the research on organized interests overlooks the lobbying of regulatory agencies even though it accounts for almost half of all lobbying—even though bureaucratic agencies have considerable leeway in the how they choose to implement law. This groundbreaking new book argues that lobbying activity is not mainly a struggle among competing interests over highly collective goods; rather, it’s the public provision of private goods.  And more to the point, this shift in understanding influences our perception of the strengths and weaknesses of American democracy.

Through a series of highly readable case studies, the authors employ both neopluralist and exchange perspectives to explore the lobbying activity that occurs in the later stages of the policymaking process which are typically less partisan, involve little conflict, and receive scant public attention. Lobbying and Policymaking sheds new light on lobbying influence on the policy process, and is an ideal way to expose students to cutting-edge research in an accessible, fascinating package.

FEATURES & BENEFITS:

  • Insights in the book advantageously draw on the practical lobbying experience of one of the authors, strengthening the link between theory and practice.
  • Eight case studies, rich with detail and insider information, offer students a birds’ eye view into the lobbying of bureaucratic agencies that both test and illustrate concepts and hypotheses.
  • The authors have developed a formal model in the book—which is kept to a single chapter—to test their theory of policymaking, with all aspects of the model summarized in prose.
  • The authors draw from two large datasets—effectively displayed in figures and tables throughout the book—to compare competing explanations of lobbying influence.
  • “So You Want to Become a Lobbyist” appendix offers students a window on the types of career paths that executive branch lobbyists follow and the techniques they rely on when influencing federal policy.
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This is the first edition of this work.

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Table of Contents

 

  1. Key Concepts and Ideas
    • WHAT DO LOBBYISTS DO?
    • KEY TERMS
      • Types of Lobbyists
      • Types of Policies
    • APPROACH OF THIS BOOK
      • Data
      • Theoretical Rigor and Practical Politics
  2. Models of Influence
    • TWO MODELS AND TWO METAPHORS
    • THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
    • COMPETING MODELS OF GROUP INFLUENCE ON POLICY
      • Pluralism and Elitism
      • The Challenge of Exchange Models
      • Issue Networks
      • Can We Reject the Exchange or Pluralist Models?
    • NEOPLURALISM: IT ALL DEPENDS
    • INTEREST GROUPS, PARTIES, AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
    • SUMMARY
  3. The Policy Process
    • MAKING SENSE OF THE POLICY PROCESS
    • POLICY STAGES AND THE STUDY OF GROUP INFLUENCE
    • ENERGY POLICY
    • THE AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT
    • THE DATA QUALITY ACT AND THE BATTLE OVER ATRAZINE
      • The Impact of the DQA on Regulation
      • The Battle over Atrazine
    • PLACING OUR CASE STUDIES WITHIN THE POLICY STAGES FRAMEWORK
    • THE ROLE OF COLLECTIVE AND PRIVATE GOODS
    • SUMMARY
  4. Policymaking by Regulatory Agencies
    • THE BREADTH OF THE REGULATORY PROCESS
    • THE ROLE OF THE BUREAUCRACY IN THE CREATION OF LAW
      • The Principal-Agent Dilemma
    • THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS AND LOBBYING
    • LOBBYING STRATEGIES
    • CASE STUDIES OF A POLICY PATROL AND A FIRE ALARM
      • Implementing the Data Quality Act
    • THE EPA AND THE REGULATION OF PERCHLORATE
    • SUMMARY
  5. Interest Group Participation, Strategies and Success in the Regulatory Process
    • INCENTIVES FOR LOBBYING THE BUREAUCRACY
    • THE FREQUENCY AND PERCEIVED IMPORTANCE OF REGULATORY LOBBYING
    • PERCEIVED LOBBYING SUCCESS
    • WHOSE INPUTS INFLUENCE THE RULEMAKING PROCESS?
      • Written Comments Concerning a Proposed Rule
      • Participation in Federal Advisory Committees
      • Lobbying Congress to Affect Regulatory Agencies
      • Public Hearings
    • REGULATORY WAIVERS
    • SUMMARY
  6. Lobbying Alone or Cooperatively
    • INTRODUCTION
    • DRUG REIMPORTATION
    • THE DEATH TAX
    • THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COOPERATIVE LOBBYING
      • Building a Coalition
      • Benefits of Joining a Coalition
      • Building a Coalition to Block Policy Change
      • Costs of Participation in Coalitions and Cooperative Lobbying Efforts
    • EMPIRICAL ISSUES CONCERNING COOPERATION AND LOBBYING SUCCESS
    • SUMMARY
  7. The Case for Neopluralism  
    • LIMITATIONS OF PREVIOUS STUDIES OF LOBBYING
      • Concentrating on Campaign Contributions and Roll-call Votes
      • Examining Single Issues
      • Studying only High-Conflict and Highly Visible Issues
    • SOLUTIONS TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEMS
    • TESTING NEOPLURALIST EXPECTATIONS
      • Policymaking and Lobbying are Lengthy Processes Involving Multiple Decisions
      • Major Policy Changes Involve Competitive Lobbying
      • Government Officials are Effective Policy Advocates
      • Political Parties, Ideology, and Elections Constrain Interest Group Influence
      • The Power of Inertia
      • Overcoming the Free-Rider Problem  
      • Institutions Matter
    • WHAT RESOURCES ARE IMPORTANT TO LOBBYING SUCCESS?
    • WHY DO RESOURCES APPEAR NOT TO MATTER?
    • SUMMARY
  8. Evidence for the Exchange Model
    • THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR POLICY SUPPORT
      • The Price Officials Charge
      • The Price Groups Pay
      • Enforcing Exchange Agreements
      • The Resources Interest Organizations Provide Policymakers
      • Exchanges with Unelected Policymakers
    • IMPLICATIONS OF EXCHANGE MODELS FOR POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
    • IMPLICATIONS OF EXCHANGE THEORY FOR LOBBYING STRATEGIES
    • THE ROLE OF PRIVATE GOODS IN LOBBYING
    • A TEST OF THE EXCHANGE MODEL
    • SUMMARY
  9. Building a Model of Lobbying
    • THE MOOSE HUNT
      • Building Coalitions
    • BUILDING A MODEL OF LOBBYING
      • The Role of Political Institutions and Policymakers’ Costs
      • Allowing Multiple Winners and Allowing No Winners
      • Models of Lobbying for Collective Goods  
      • A Model that Includes Private and Collective Goods
    • NONTECHNICAL SUMMARY OF THE LOBBYING MODELS
    • RESOURCE ALLOCATION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND COLLECTIVE GOODS
      • What Firms Want and the Value of Policy Decisions
      • A Multivariate Analysis of Lobbying Decisions
    • CONCLUSION
    • A MORE FORMAL PRESENTATION
  10. Conclusions and Implications
    • WHAT DO INTERESTS WANT AND WHAT STRATEGIES DO THEY USE?
      • Private versus Collective Goods
      • Private Goods versus Collective Goods
      • Campaign Contributions
      • The Decision to Lobby, Cheap Ride, or Free Ride
      • Coalition Players
    • LEGISLATING VERSUS POLICYMAKING
    • WHAT FACTORS LEAD TO LOBBYING SUCCESS?
      • Defend the Status Quo
      • Seek Private Goods Rather than Collective Goods
      • Participate in Lobbying Enterprises
    • IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
      • Is “Business” the Bad Guy?
    • FINAL THOUGHTS

Bibliography
Glossary of Terms
Appendix 1: So You Think You Want to Be a Lobbyist 

Reviews
“Books about lobbying usually either over-emphasizing theory or the over-generalize from exciting stories. “Lobbying and Policymaking” brings a beautiful blend of both. Theories about lobbying and interest groups are brought to life through compelling cases. In my experience, people learn best when they integrate their heads (the theory side) with their guts (working through real problems). “Lobbying and Policymaking” strikes the perfect balance.” - David King, Harvard University

“The approach of the book to interest groups and public policy is one of its great strengths. The authors are on top of the literature, and have done a great deal of research of their own. I applaud their effort to keep theories, models and frameworks prominent in the chapters. As the authors stress, covering agency rulemaking is very important, but often neglected, in studies of interest group influence. Coverage is another great strength of the book.” - Donald Baumer, Smith College

“Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin have produced a book that is thorough and rigorous, rich in theory and data. Students will learn much from it. So will their professors. By integrating models of interest group influence with models of policymaking, the authors illustrate why and how lobbying strategies vary over time and across settings. The discussion and analysis of neopluralism and exchange theory will provide students with valuable tools to make sense of interest group politics and the policy process. The focus on regulatory policy is an especially useful feature of this book. Regulatory politics tends not to receive much attention in standard texts on interest groups. Lobbying and Policymaking fills an important gap by illustrating how a lot of lobbying activity takes place out of public view – which is just how many interests want it!” - Julio Borquez, University of Michigan-Dearborn

“Lobbying and Policymaking is an important addition to the interest group and policymaking literature particularly in the context of the role that lobbying has on rulemaking, which one might argue is the primary policymaking process currently in use in the United States. The authors do a wonderful job providing a strong theoretical background, discussing the important research to date, and putting that research into an important context for their own research. The balance between the use of case studies and quantitative data makes this a highly readable and accessible book. Students and scholars will garner a new appreciation of the role of lobbying particularly as it relates to the bureaucracy.” - Scott Furlong

“With a host of empirical examples and a solid set of theoretical underpinnings, Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin have written a lively, rigorous text that integrates our understanding of lobbying and the policymaking process. The authors cast their net widely, using lobbying as a means to understand how policies are made in legislative, regulatory, and bureaucratic settings. Lobbying and Policymaking will guide students through the intricacies of policy making, neither oversimplifying the process nor making it seem so complex to defy comprehension. Tying together their own research with a strong overview of both lobbying and policy making, Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin have provided a road map for understanding of who gets what, when, where, and why.” - Burdett Loomis, University of Kansas

Writing for undergraduate students and scholars, Godwin (political science, U. of North Carolina Charlotte) et al. argue that paying attention to rulemaking institutions and the public provision of private goods changes the standard picture of lobbying and the policy making process. - Book News, Inc.
Bio(s)
R. Kenneth Godwin
Kenneth Godwin is the Marshall Rauch Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of North Carolina Charlotte. He previously taught at the University of North Texas, University of Arizona, and Oregon State University. He also served as the Rockefeller Environmental Fellow at Resources for the Future. Godwin is the author or coauthor of seven books concerning public policy issues and interest groups. His articles have appeared in numerous journals including the American Political Science Review, Journal of Politics, Southern Economic Journal, Public Choice, and AI. From 2000 to 2006, he served as the coeditor of Political Research Quarterly.

Scott Ainsworth
Scott H. Ainsworth is professor of political science in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia. His work on lobbying, interest groups, and the U.S. Congress has appeared in numerous outlets including the American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, and Legislative Studies Quarterly. He is the author of Analyzing Interest Groups and coauthor of Abortion Politics in Congress: Strategic Incrementalism and Policy Change.

Erik K. Godwin
Erik Godwin is assistant professor of political science at Texas A&M University. His research interests focus on policy design and its implementation by the federal bureaucracy. Godwin received his Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and he holds a Master of Public Policy from the University of Michigan. Godwin previously conducted financial and economic analyses for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of Justice. He joined the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Clinton White House. After leaving the White House, he spent six years as an executive-branch lobbyist on environmental, energy, and health issues.
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